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Este artigo analisa a experiência brasileira depois da adoção do regime de metas de inflação 
no que concerne aos efeitos causados pelas novas práticas de transparência e de comunicação 
na  política  monetária.  Baseia-se  nas  metodologias  propostas  por  Cook  e  Hahn  (1989)  e 
Kuttner (2001) e utiliza-se de dados diários de transações do mercado futuro de depósitos 
interfinanceiros da BMF&BOVESPA para analisar a ocorrência de mudanças na formação de 
expectativas do mercado financeiro, considerando as ações de política monetária de julho de 
1999  a  janeiro de 2009.  Além  da  análise  para o período  total, dois outros períodos  são 
considerados: o “período de maturação” – a primeira fase dos efeitos causados pelo aumento 
da transparência do banco central; e o “período de sabedoria” – a segunda fase que considera 
as percepções do mercado financeiro em ambiente de maior transparência. Os resultados 
indicam que as reações do mercado financeiro em face das mudanças na taxa-meta de juros 
não são negligenciáveis. Em particular, a redução dos desvios-padrões das estimações no 
período de sabedoria sugere que o comportamento do Banco Central do Brasil ao longo do 
tempo aumentou a capacidade dos agentes de mercado de prever as decisões do Comitê de 
Política Monetária. 
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Abstract 
This article makes an analysis of the  Brazilian experience after the adoption of inflation 
targeting  concerning  the  effects  caused  by  the  new  practices  of  transparency  and 
communication  in the monetary  policy.  Based  on  methodologies  proposed by  Cook  and 
Hahn (1989)  and  Kuttner  (2001)  and making  use  of  daily data  from  transactions  in the 
interbank  deposit  futures  market  of  the  Securities,  Commodities  and  Futures  Exchange 
(BMF&BOVESPA),  the  occurrence  of  changes  in  the  financial  market’s  expectation  in 
regard to monetary policy actions from July 1999 to January 2009 is analyzed. Besides the 
analysis for the whole period, two other periods are considered: the “maturation period” - the 
first phase of the effects caused by an increase in central bank transparency; and the “wisdom 
period” - the second phase in the financial market’s perception regarding an environment 
with more transparency. The findings indicate that the reaction of the financial market to 
changes in the interest rate target is not negligible. In particular, the fall in the standard errors 
for estimations in the wisdom period suggests that the Central Bank of Brazil’s behavior over 
time  has  increased  the  capacity  of  market  agents  to  forecast  the  Monetary  Policy 
Committee’s decisions. 
 
Key words: transparency, monetary policy, inflation targeting, interest deposit futures market 
Área 3 - JEL classification: E52, E43. 
   2
1. Introduction 
   
  The  growing  attention  of  central  bankers  to  guide  public’s  expectation  can 
improve the transmission mechanism and the effectiveness of the monetary policy. An 
important  tool  in  this  framework  is  the  central  bank  transparency.  In  particular, 
transparency  is  important  under  an  environment  with  inflation  targeting  because  it 
contributes  to an  increase  in the  convergence  between public’s expectation  and the 
inflation target. Among several points which represent an advantage due to an increase 
in transparency, three deserve attention: (i) avoids the possibility of inflation bias and 
time  inconsistency  in  the  management  of  the  monetary  policy;  (ii)  represents  a 
technology that contributes to develop credibility; and (iii) increases the central bank 
accountability.
1 
  Nowadays practices which decrease asymmetrical information between the central 
bank and the private agents can represent a preoccupation by policymakers in reducing 
idiosyncratic errors by the public. The dissemination of monetary regimes which work 
with more transparency and that pay attention to the public’s expectation may indicate a 
new manner of taking into consideration a greater vulnerability of the economies in a 
globalized world.
2 
  In  fact,  a  combination  of  an  efficient  communication  and  higher 
transparency can facilitate the task of guiding the public’s expectation which in turn can 
promote an environment where the private agents make decisions in a more efficient 
way.
3 Under this view, actions and communications of the central bank which affect the 
term  structure  of  interest  rates  (principally  long-term  interest  rates),  increase  the 
efficiency of the economy and improve the efficiency regarding the public’s decisions 
on consumption and investment and thus amplify the effects of monetary transmission 
mechanisms (Brunner, 1981; Blinder, 1998; and Woodford, 2001).
  
In brief, an important question that needs an answer is how the central bank may 
define the correct degree of transparency, an efficient communication strategy, and how 
to evaluate the results caused by the new strategy adopted. It is important to highlight 
that  the  analysis  concerning  the  effects  of  a  higher  central  bank  transparency  in 
emerging  economies  which  have  adopted  inflation  targeting  is  particularly  relevant 
because these economies are more vulnerable to shocks. As a consequence, anchoring 
public’s  expectation  and  developing  credibility  represent  a  basic  condition  for  the 
success of the central bank in the management of the monetary policy. 
According to Blinder et al (2008) the use of inflation targeting has been the 
preferred  way  for  anchoring  expectations  and  thus  becomes  an  essential  source  of 
research  for  analyzing  the  consequences  of  an  increase  in  the  central  bank 
communication on economy. Moreover an important aspect for determining an efficient 
strategy of communication is to understand how new  information is perceived by a 
developed and sophisticated financial market. In particular, as stated by Owens and 
Webb (2001), the interest rate futures market permits perceiving the financial market 
expectation  for  the  term  structure of  interest  rate  with a  greater  efficiency  than  the 
recent past.  
  This article makes an analysis of the Brazilian experience after the adoption of 
inflation targeting concerning the effects caused by the new practices of transparency 
and communication in the monetary policy. Brazil is a country that deserves attention 
                                                 
1 Regarding advantages caused by an increase in central bank transparency, see Geraats (2002); Gaspar, 
Smets, and Vestin (2006); and de Mendonça and Simão Filho (2007). 
2 There exists an extensive literature concerning this subject. See Guthrie and Wright (2000); Orphanides 
and  Williams  (2002);  Walsh  (2003);  Demiralp  and  Jorda  (2004);  Kohn  and Sack (2004);  Woodford 
(2005); de Haan, Eijffinger, and Rybinski (2007); and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a). 
3 See Svensson (2006); Woodford (2005); and Morris and Shin (2002).   3
because  it  is  the  largest  economy  in  Latin  America  and  has  had  success  in  the 
management  of  macroeconomic  policies.  The  success  of  the  stabilization  program 
started in July 1994 (Real Plan) and complemented in July 1999 by the adoption of 
inflation targeting permitted the Brazilian economy to reach the investment grade rating 
in  2008.  Another  point  that  cannot  be  neglected  is  that  Brazil  has  a  sophisticated 
financial market. Therefore, Brazil is an adequate laboratory experiment for emergings 
economies. 
Based on methodologies proposed by Cook and Hahn (1989) and Kuttner (2001) 
and making use of daily data from transactions in the interbank deposit futures market 
of  the  Securities,  Commodities  and  Futures  Exchange  (BMF&BOVESPA),  the 
occurrence of changes in the financial market’s expectation in regard to monetary policy 
actions from July 1999 to January 2009 is analyzed. In short, the main objective of this 
study is to analyze changes in the Brazilian financial market behavior concerning the 
monetary policy strategy adopted by the Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) in the inflation 
targeting  period.  Beyond  the  analysis  for  the  whole  period,  two  other  periods  are 
considered: the “maturation period” - the first phase of the effects caused by an increase 
in  central  bank  transparency;  and  the  “wisdom  period”  -  the  second  phase  in  the 
financial market’s perception regarding an environment with more transparency. 
This article is organized as follows. The next section makes a brief presentation 
of the connection between transparency and expectation hypothesis of the term structure 
of  interest  rate  (EHT).  Moreover,  the  methodologies  proposed  by  Cook  and  Hahn 
(1989) and Kuttner (2001) are presented. Section 3 highlights the main changes in the 
Brazilian monetary policy due to the adoption of inflation targeting. Section 4 presents 
the data and methodology applied in this study. Section 5 makes an empirical analysis 
for the Brazilian financial market. The last section concludes the article. 
 
2. A note about transparency and EHT 
 
The research on new practices in the management of the monetary policy, which 
combines degree of transparency with a communication process, did still not present a 
definitive strategy. In a general way, the effects caused by central bank communication 
are little comprehended and there is no consensus in regard to the best practices for the 
central bank to improve the efficiency of the monetary policy. 
The  literature  concerning  central  bank  communication  points  out  that  three 
points need to be considered for evaluating the impact on the public’s comprehension: 
(i)  selection  of  macroeconomic  variables  which  work  as  an  anchor  for  public’s 
expectation;  (ii)  content,  procedure,  and  moment  of  issuing  the  information  by  the 
monetary authority; and (iii) framework, organization, and how the monetary policy 
committees work. In addition, according to Blinder et al (2008) the studies which look 
for  an  answer  regarding  an  adequate  central  bank  transparency  and  its  effects  on 
financial market include three perspectives. The first studies the presence of changes in 
the  volatility  of  prices  when  the  central  bank  communication  occurs.
  4  The  second 
analyzes the efficiency of each manner of communication by the central bank.
5 The 
third  line  of  research  evaluates  changes  in  the  degree  of  public’s  comprehension 
regarding  the  monetary  policy  adopted  due  to  modifications  in  the  degree  of 
transparency and in the strategy of communication.
6 
                                                 
4 See Kohn and Sack (2004), Connoly and Kohler (2004), and Reeves and Sawick (2007). 
5 See Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a, 2007b), and de Haan, Eijffinger, and Rybinski (2007). 
6 See Cook and Hahn (1989), Kuttner (2001), Poole and Rasche (2003), and Lange, Sack, and Whitesell 
(2003).   4
The analysis  concerning the  expectations  hypothesis  of  the  term  structure  of 
interest  rate  (EHT)  is  a  way  of  evaluating  the  presence  of  changes  in  the  public’s 
behavior under an environment with more transparency  in the monetary policy. The 
observation, for a period of time, of the changes in the pattern of behavior of term 
structure of interest rate can detect modification in the public’s behavior. Reactions that 
anticipate actions and communications of the monetary policy can reveal change in the 
public’s  behavior  (caused  by  a  better  comprehension  of  monetary  policy)  and 
adjustments in the degree of transparency as well as in the strategy of communication. 
Some authors analyzed the effect of changes in the interest rate target defined by 
the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) on asset prices and derivatives negotiated in the 
financial  market  for  several  maturities.  Among  authors  which  concluded  that  there 
exists little evidence for EHT are: Mankiw and Miron (1986), Shiller, Campbell, and 
Schoenholtz  (1983),  Campbell  and  Shiller  (1991),  Fama  (1984),  Mishkin  (1988), 
Hardouvelis (1988) and Longstaff (2000). On the other hand, a list of some authors who 
detected that central bank disclosures make significant effects on the short-term interest 
rate and on asset prices are: Cook and Hahn (1989), Roley and Sellon (1995), Thornton 
(1998),  Bomfim  and  Reinhart  (2000),  Poole  and  Rasche  (2000),  Bomfim  (2003), 
Rigobon and Sack (2004), and Kuttner (2001). The main difference in the results is 
attributed to the divergence in the empirical analysis and data used. 
In  particular,  the  studies  of  Cook  and  Hahn  (1990)  and  Rudebusch  (1995) 
deserve attention because they create a logical sense in the literature. These authors 
analyze  the  non-anticipated  reaction  of  the  financial  market  to  the  central  bank 
disclosures.  The  conclusion  is  that  the  short-term  interest  rate  has  information  on 
changes that  will occur in the interest rates in the short-term. Notwithstanding, this 
observation loses significance while the time horizon is extended (Lange, Sack, and 
Whitesell, 2003).  
An aspect that deserves special attention and that can explain the divergence in 
the analysis concerning EHT is the hypothesis that the interest rate forecast capability in 
the financial markets is an indicator of transparency, clarity, communication, and of the 
effectiveness  of  the  monetary  policy  (Bernoth  and  von  Hagen,  2004).  Therefore,  a 
higher degree of central bank transparency can improve the efficiency of EHT because 
it promotes a convergence between market interest rate expectations and the objectives 
of  the  monetary  policy.  According  to  Kuttner  (2001)  a  higher  transparency  in  the 
conduction  of  the  monetary  policy  can  amplify  the  financial  market’s  capability  of 
anticipating the actions of the monetary policy. As a consequence, an analysis of EHT 
which allow a better comprehension of the changes in the behavior of the financial 
market demands a division between  non-anticipated and anticipated reactions to the 
monetary policy. 
Ehrman  and  Fratzscher  (2007b)  highlight  that  the  measurement  of  the 
effectiveness  of  communication  as  a  tool  of  monetary  policy  must  consider  three 
aspects: (i) change in the ability of financial market to forecast future decisions of the 
monetary policy; (ii) skill of monetary policymakers to influence financial markets in 
changing asset prices; and (iii) central bank’s capability to anchor and to guide market 
expectation  for  medium  and  long  terms.  Hence,  the  public’s  comprehension  of  the 
strategy adopted by a central bank may consider the disclosure of data which contains a 
central bank’s forecast for the performance of the economy (Bernanke, 2008).  
More accurate information with extended maturities may affect the long-term 
expectation of the term structure of the interest rate which can make it more sensitive to 
changes in the interest rate promoted by the central bank. Kuttner (2001) advances the 
analysis of the EHT making use of data from the American future interest rate market 
and dividing the reaction of the financial market into anticipated and non-anticipated to 
changes in the federal funds rate.    5
 
2.1. Reaction of the financial market 
 
The  methodologies  proposed  by  Cook  and  Hahn  (1989)  and  Kuttner  (2001) 
permit  the  analysis  of  the  reaction  of  the  financial  market  to  the  actions  and 
communications  of  the  monetary  policy.  The  main  characteristic  of  the  analysis 
developed by Cook and Hahn (1989) is the observation of the response of the interest 
rate practiced in the financial market on the day of MPC’s meeting to the interest rate 
target defined by the central bank. 
It is important to note that under an environment with high transparency, the 
observation of a change in the market interest rate can imply a misunderstanding of the 
behavior in the financial market. There exists the risk of confusing the validation of 
EHT with the measurement of the non-anticipated reaction to the statement of a new 
interest rate target. The absence of variation of the market interest rate on the day of 
MPC’s  announcement  of  a  new  target  could  mean  that  the  financial  market  was 
insensitive to the variation of the interest rate target and could thus invalidate the EHT. 
On the other hand, if the central bank is successful in guiding expectations, the absence 
of variation in the market interest rate would denote that the financial market already 
anticipated the movement in the interest rate.  
The observation above can explain why Kuttner (2001) detected a worsening of 
the  financial  market  reaction  to  the  FOMC’s  interest  rate  setting  after  the  period 
analyzed by Cook and Hahn (1989).
7 Kuttner (2001) admits that this result can be a 
consequence of a higher Fed transparency. Therefore, the methodology of Cook and 
Hahn  (1989)  needs  to  be  complemented  by  the  possibility  of  the  financial  market 
anticipating the reaction. In fact, the methodology proposed by Cook and Hahn (1989) 
takes into account only changes in the backward-looking reaction which in turn can be 
attenuated  by  an  increase  in  the  anticipation  of  monetary  policy  actions  due  to  an 
increase in central bank transparency. 
Kuttner (2001) introduces the expectations present in the  interest rate futures 
market in the literature. This perspective considers the futures interest rate before 
0
, s t f  
and  after 
0
, 1 s t f    MPC  sets the  interest  rate. The difference  between these  rates 
u
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reveals how the financial market reacted in a non-anticipated (unexpected) way to the 
change in the interest rate target. Hence, 













, s t f  is the expectation of the average funds rate in month s on date t, and m is the 
number of days in the month.  
  The difference between the changes in the interest rate target defined by the MPC 
( m r  ) and the non-anticipated reaction (
u
t r  ) is the anticipated reaction (expected) of 
the financial market (
e
t r  ). Therefore, when 
u
t r   is close to zero, and thus there exists a 
convergence between 
e
t r   and  m r  , the interpretation is that the financial market has a 
better comprehension of the monetary policy. Hence, 
(2) 
e u
t m t r r r     . 
  The  empirical  analysis  of  the  EHT  based  on  MPC’s  decisions,  applying  the 
methodology proposed by Kuttner (2001), can be made through OLS estimation where 
                                                 
7 The period analyzed by Cook and Hahn (1989) spans from 1974 to 1979, while Kuttner (2001) makes 
the analysis from 1989 to 2000.   6
the  dependent  variable  is  the  change  in  the  future market  interest  rate  for different 
maturities ) (
h
t R  , before and after the MPC sets the interest rate target. The independent 
variables are 
e
t r   and 
u
t r  . Then, the equation to be estimated is given by 
(3)  1 2
h u e
t t t t R r r            . 
  Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) proposed the use of future interest rates with 
greater maturity than used by Kuttner (2001) to segregate non-anticipated reaction of 
the anticipated. The main argument is that the nearest expiration date of the interbank 
deposit  futures  market  can  be  influenced  by  the  noise  caused  by  the  more  intense 
correction of interest rate forecast errors. 
 
3. Changes in the Brazilian monetary policy 
 
The supposition of change in the Brazilian financial market after the adoption of 
inflation targeting is based on the hypothesis that a higher central bank transparency 
improves  the  public’s  comprehension  regarding  the  management  of  the  monetary 
policy. Due to the central bank’s objective of guiding the public’s expectation, it is 
expected  that  the  expectation  of  a  change  in  the central  bank’s  interest rate  setting 
behavior corresponds to the effective change in the interest rate target. This result would 
suggest  that  the  communication  strategy  and  the  degree  of  transparency  adjust  the 
public’s expectation in a better manner. 
  According to Owens and Webb (2001) the contracts of future interest rates are 
non-biased  forecaster  of  future  interest  rates  and  have  been  considered  a  useful 
instrument for identifying anticipated changes in the monetary policy. It is important to 
note that there exists a difference between the future market interest rate and the target 
interest rate in Brazil. The interest rate which represents the tool of monetary policy is 
the  Over/SELIC (overnight rate) while  the  interest rate which  is  used in  the  future 
markets is the DI-CETIP rate. The Over/SELIC rate is a result of transactions of one 
workday in the interbank market for federal public bonds. The interest rate which works 
as a reference for transactions in the Brazilian interbank market is the DI-CETIP rate. 
The  contract  negotiated  in  the  Brazilian  futures  market  concerning  interest  rate 
considers the average interest rate which represents the expectation of DI-CETIP rate 
accumulated until the expiration date of the contract. Hence there exists information 
concerning the behavior of future interest rates. 
Due to the fact that the both above-mentioned interest rates are practiced in the 
interbank market in transactions with banking reserves with maturity of one day, the 
difference  between  them  is  in  regard  to  the  credit  risk,  which  in  turn  is  lower  in 
operations with public bonds. In a general way, the credit risk of the transactions among 
banks  with  maturity  of  one  day  is  negligible.  As  a  consequence,  in  practice, 
Over/SELIC  and  DI-CETIP  are  very  closed  due  to  the  arbitrage  operation  in  the 
interbank market. 
After the adoption of flexible exchange rate regime in January 1999 and the 
adoption of inflation targeting in June 1999, Brazil has experienced new practices to 
conduct  its  monetary  policy.
8  Under  inflation  targeting,  the  central  bank’s  implicit 
function  of  guiding  public’s  expectation  implies  an  increase  in  the  accountability 
concerning information. The objective of increasing the transparency of the CBB is 
observed in the inauguration speech of the current governor of CBB: 
 
“The production of reports and the release of studies and research is also 
                                                 
8 For an analysis of inflation targeting and its performance in Brazil, see de Mendonça (2007).   7
fundamental  aiming  at  increasing  the  transparency  of  the  Bank's 
activities to the public. (…) Thus, the Central Bank will emphasize not 
only the improvement of statistics and models, but also its transparency 
and communication.” (Meirelles, 2003, p. 6) 
 
Indeed, although the changes in Presidency of the Republic and in the chairman of 
CBB during the inflation targeting have occurred, the priority in the stabilization of 
prices and the increase in the transparency in the conduction of the monetary policy 
remain. Therefore, there is no doubt that with the adoption of inflation targeting, several 
measures for increasing the CBB transparency have been adopted. The definition of 
inflation targets 2 years in advance, the disclosure of inflation reports and the minutes of 
MPC’s  meetings,  the  publication  of  open  letters  when  the  inflation  target  is  not 
achieved, are examples of practices adopted which increased the transparency of the 
monetary policy.  
  The CBB’s communication has a regular pattern. The MPC’s meetings have been 
held every 45 days since 2006 (from 1999 to 2005 the meetings were monthly). Two 
consecutive  days  are  used  for  the  meetings  and  at  the  end  of  the  second  day  the 
decisions are disclosed. After 5  workdays  from the end of the meeting, the MPC’s 
minutes are disclosed explaining the central bank’s reasons for its decisions. 
It is important to note that the MPC’s decisions are quite always unanimous , and 
the number of votes of the committee is informed in the minute published after each 
meeting. Based on the classification adopted by Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2007a), the 
MPC’s decisions are collegial as there is no individual exposition concerning decisions. 
Therefore, the recent characteristics of the Brazilian monetary policy suggest that 
there have occurred  improvements  in transparency  and  communication.  Hence,  it  is 
important to analyze if this new behavior of the Brazilian monetary authority implied a 
change in the reaction of the financial market to MPC’s interest rate settings after the 
adoption  of  inflation  targeting  (July  1999).  It  is  expected  that  the  adoption  of  this 
monetary strategy increases the public’s perception on monetary policy and induces the 
public’s expectation to the targets defined by the central bank. As a consequence, it is 
supposed that the anticipated reaction to the monetary policy is not negligible in the 
period. 
It is important to highlight that the few communications to the public in the time 
between the week after MPC’s meeting and the next meeting contribute to an analysis 
of  the  financial  market  reaction.  The  main  reason  is  that  the  public’s  expectation 
regarding  changes  in the  interest  rate target  is  focused on  the  date close  to MPC’s 
meetings. Hence the observation of the variation in the market interest rate, before and 
after MPC’s meetings, can allow the measurement of the degree of anticipated reaction 
by the financial market. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
This study makes an evaluation of the changes in the Brazilian financial market, 
after the  adoption of inflation targeting, inspired in the methodologies suggested by 
Cook and Hahn (1989) and Kuttner (2001).
9 The changes in the backward-looking and 
forward-looking reactions in the Brazilian financial market is based on the observation 
of the  variation  in the interest rate practiced in the National Treasury  Bills (LTNs) 
market and in the interbank deposit futures market for the period from July 1999 to 
                                                 
9 Another type of analysis which considers the effect of an increase in the central bank transparency on 
volatility of macroeconomic variables for the Brazilian case is presented by de Mendonça and Simão 
Filho (2008).   8
January 2009.  
This analysis considers the whole period, and two other periods. The first period 
from July 1999 to December 2003 and the second from January 2004 to January 2009. 
The first period is defined as a “maturation period”, that is, the period for adaptation of 
the financial market to the increase in the transparency of the monetary policy. This 
period  is  marked  by  some  instabilities  (energy  crisis  (2001),  presidential  election 
(2002), etc.) and by the effort for developing credibility. The second period is defined as 
a “wisdom period”, which represents a period with domestic macroeconomic stability 
and the perception of the financial market regarding central bank transparency is greater 
than the previous period. 
The  variations  in  the  yields  of  LTNs  (data  from  BMF&BOVESPA)  and  of 
futures market (data from ANBIMA) are achieved taking into account the variation in 
the interest rates before and after MPC’s announcement of the interest rate target. It is 
important to note that the number of negotiations in the future market is greater than the 
negotiations in the LTNs market. Table 1 compares the frequency of negotiations in 
LTNs market to futures market for July 1999 to January 2009, which corresponds to 
103  MPC’s  meetings.  Each  observation  regarding  the  variation  of  the  interest  rate 
considers  the  existence  of  negotiations  before  and  after  the  communication  of  the 
interest rate target for each maturity under analysis (from 1 month to 7 months).  
 
Table 1 
Frequency of negotiations in LTNs market and futures market (Jul/99- Jan/09) 
Maturity    LTNs    Futures 
At most 1 month     LTN0  45    FIR0  103 
At most 2 months    LTN1  38    FIR1  101 
At most 3 months    LTN2  46    FIR2  97 
At most 4 months    LTN3  42    FIR3  85 
At most 5 months    LTN4  34    FIR4  35 
At most 6 months    LTN5  42    FIR5  45 
At most 7 months    LTN6  36    FIR6  37 
   
Based on  information  gathered  from CBB,
10  the  changes  in the  interest  rate 
targets with its respective date and time of disclosure for the public, the non-anticipated 
and anticipated interest rates (see equations 1 and 2) based on each of the next two 
expirations  dates  of  the  one-day  interbank  deposit  futures  market  (first  and  second 
expiration dates after each MPC’s meeting), are considered.
11 Furthermore, taking into 
account the method proposed by Kuttner (2001), the sensitiveness of the interest rates to 
anticipations and non-anticipations regarding the interest rate targets based on the first 
(hereafter “Kuttner1”) and second (hereafter “Kuttner2”) expiration dates of the futures 
market, permits the identification of the best methodology for evaluating the behavior of 
the Brazilian financial market.  
It is important to highlight that due to the backward-looking characteristic of the 
analysis proposed by Cook and Hahn (1989) – hereafter “Cook- Hahn” - the response of 
the interest rate is directly comparable to the unanticipated response in the Kuttner1 and 
Kuttner2 models. In brief, making use of estimations by OLS method for the three 
                                                 
10 Available from authors on request. 
11 The use of the second expiration date is based on suggestion made by Poole, Rasche, and Thornton 
(2002).   9
models (Cook-Hahn, Kuttner1, and Kuttner2), the first step considers the whole period 
and the second step makes an analysis for the maturation period and for the wisdom 
period. 
 
5. Empirical evidence 
 
In a general way, independent of the methodology applied, the interest rates in 
LTNs  market  with  maturity  up  to  3  months  (LTN0  to  LTN2)  indicate  that  the 
coefficients for the response of LTNs rates to changes in the interest rate target are 
relatively stable  and  are  statistically  significant  (see  table 2).  Contrary  to  this,  it  is 
observed that for the interest rates with greater maturity, with the exception of LTN5, 
the magnitude of the coefficient for the response fall considerably and the statistical 
significance  is  eliminated.  In  brief,  while  the  horizon  is  increasing  the  response  of 
interest rates in LTNs market is decreasing. This result is in accordance with that found 
by Cook and Hahn which denotes that the EHT is valid for short-term interest rates. 
Focusing  on  the  models  Kuttner1  and  Kuttner2  it  is  possible  to  identify  the 
behavior of the financial market regarding the announcements of the interest rate target. 
In other words, if the financial market anticipated or not the MPC’s decision on the 
interest  rate  target.  The  results  from  both  models  do  not  present  a  considerable 
difference. With exception for the case of LTN0 in Kuttner1, there exists an indication 
that the unanticipated response is greater than the anticipated response.  
With the objective of checking the validity of the result above, a Wald test was 
performed (see table A.1 – appendix). The findings indicate that the difference between 
the coefficients of unanticipated and anticipated responses of LTNs to changes in the 
interest rate target is not significant. As a consequence, it is not possible to assure for 
this market, taking into account the whole period, a positive effect caused by an increase 
in transparency and communication. 
  In the futures market the prices are defined based on the expectation of the futures 
interest rates and they are used for reducing the exposition of market agents to variation 
in the interest rate. Therefore, the behavior in this market is different from LTNs which 
has the objective of financing the federal budget deficits and thus the variation in the 
interest rate target implies an influence on supply and demand for these bonds. Hence, 
the analysis concerning anticipation and non-anticipation response of the futures interest 
rate to changes in the interest rate target also gives information regarding the analysis of 
the behavior of the Brazilian financial market. 
  The results present in table 2 suggest that the use of the futures interest rate is 
better than in LTNs market  in the models. In a general way, the statistics are better for 
the models with futures interest rate (greater R
2, lower SE, etc.). A possible justification 
for this result is that other variables can explain the volatility in LTNs market. Such as 
identified  by  Owens  and  Webb (2001),  the imbalance  between supply  and  demand 
caused by public sector borrowing requirements in the National Treasury Bills market 
can promote this distortion. 
  The analysis of the Cook-Hahn model for futures interest rates implies different 
results in regard to those observed for the LTNs market. Contrary to the previous case, 
the coefficients regarding the response of interest rate to changes in the interest rate 
target have statistical significance for all maturities (except for FIR6). Therefore, this 
observation suggests that the changes in the interest rate target matters for the behavior 
in the futures market. 
An important difference concerning the results of Kuttner1 and Kuttner2 models 
for futures market in relation to LTNs market is that, according to the outcomes of Wald 
test (see table A.1 – appendix), the hypothesis that there exists difference between the   10
coefficients  of  unanticipated  and  anticipated  responses  of  futures  interest  rates  to 
changes in the interest rate target is not rejected. Hence, it is possible to conjecture an 
effect caused by an increase in transparency and communication on the behavior of this 
market.  
The findings in both models (Kuttner1 and Kuttner2) denote that unanticipated 
responses are dominant over anticipated responses. Moreover, it is observed that the 
coefficients on responses in Kuttner1 are greater than in Kuttner2 for short horizons (up 
to  3  months).  Notwithstanding,  the  statistical  significances  for  anticipated  and 
unanticipated  responses  are  very  close  for  both  models  and  the  difference  in  the 
magnitude of the coefficients is small. As a consequence, the anticipation of MPC’s 
decisions by the Brazilian financial market cannot be neglect.    Table 2 
The response of interest rates of LTNs and futures market to changes in the interest rate target (July 1999 to January 2009) 
Cook-Hahn    Kuttner1    Kuttner2   
Maturity 
 
Intercept  Response  R














2  SE  DW 
  6.21  41.87  0.33  50.37  1.79    5.46  42.12  39.33  0.33  50.84  1.79    5.63  39.67  41.02  0.35  50.32  1.82  LTN0 
  (0.82)  (4.61)***             (0.70)  (4.58)***  (3.68)***             (0.74)  (4.25)***  (4.50)***          
  6.78  53.06  0.32  65.84  1.68    8.11  52.72  56.57  0.32  66.55  1.70    5.67  49.56  51.06  0.33  66.01  1.67  LTN1 
  (0.63)  (4.09)***             (0.73)  (4.01)***  (3.79)***             (0.53)  (3.65)***  (3.87)***          
  11.53  41.24  0.21  56.98  1.59    12.42  41.73  45.99  0.21  57.37  1.62    10.52  38.23  39.20  0.21  57.36  1.60  LTN2 
  (1.37)  (3.39)***             (1.45)  (3.40)***  (3.20)***             (1.22)  (2.91)***  (3.10)***          
  7.98  10.79  0.02  57.92  1.64    10.55  5.70  17.35  0.08  56.85  1.63    6.03  4.98  7.27  0.07  57.06  1.62  LTN3 
  (0.89)  (0.87)             (1.19)  (0.45)  (1.35)             (0.68)  (0.39)  (0.58)          
  6.01  25.19  0.07  65.06  1.58    8.59  17.99  30.84  0.14  63.60  1.65    4.12  18.79  20.55  0.10  64.99  1.58  LTN4 
  (0.54)  (1.53)             (0.78)  (1.08)  (1.87)*             (0.36)  (1.07)  (1.21)          
  17.03  41.69  0.22  57.31  1.99    17.44  41.90  43.68  0.22  58.00  2.01    16.67  40.62  40.97  0.22  58.00  2.01  LTN5 
  (1.92)*  (3.36)***             (1.91)*  (3.33)***  (3.92)***             (1.83)*  (3.03)***  (3.16)***          
  13.86  13.20  0.02  58.24  2.12    16.24  6.04  16.50  0.07  57.65  2.07    13.03  9.67  10.45  0.02  58.93  2.09  LTN6 
  (1.42)  (0.79)             (1.65)  (0.35)  (0.98)             (1.30)  (0.52)  (0.58)          
  3.47  34.71  0.48  26.75  1.90    4.93  31.35  35.67  0.51  25.96  2.00    3.42  30.49  32.15  0.53  25.42  2.00  FIR0 
  (1.31)  (9.55)***             (1.89)*  (8.49)***  (10.11)***             (1.36)  (8.42)***  (9.20)***          
  4.42  26.71  0.20  38.42  1.78    5.97  23.17  28.16  0.23  37.73  1.79    4.26  21.15  23.31  0.27  36.86  1.81  FIR1 
  (1.15)  (4.94)***             (1.56)  (4.20)***  (5.29)***             (1.16)  (3.88)***  (4.43)***          
  5.95  26.29  0.18  42.78  1.75    7.46  22.94  27.50  0.20  42.33  1.77    5.71  20.88  23.10  0.24  41.32  1.79  FIR2 
  (1.36)  (4.50)***             (1.70)*  (3.80)***  (4.75)***             (1.35)  (3.53)***  (4.05)***          
  5.09  18.49  0.07  46.64  2.37    6.08  7.55  16.66  0.15  44.89  2.29    3.69  9.60  12.43  0.17  44.37  2.29  FIR3 
  (0.98)  (2.49)**             (1.21)  (0.93)  (2.35)**             (0.74)  (1.27)  (1.71)*          
  -5.32  15.82  0.09  36.52  1.62    -2.85  0.37  8.37  0.27  33.33  1.41    -5.20  13.05  13.47  0.10  37.01  1.61  FIR4 
  (-0.85)  (1.83)*             (-0.49)  (0.04)  (1.03)             (-0.81)  (1.31)  (1.41)          
  6.71  44.59  0.43  34.41  2.30    9.83  43.50  50.06  0.48  33.48  2.29    7.70  36.82  40.11  0.58  30.08  2.27  FIR5 
  (1.30)  (5.72)***             (1.91)*  (5.86)***  (6.13)***             (1.70)*  (5.35)***  (5.97)***          
  7.83  7.42  0.01  62.21  2.39    10.99  -11.75  8.70  0.13  59.16  2.59    6.25  -2.47  0.20  0.08  60.91  2.81  FIR6 
  (0.76)  (0.56)             (1.11)  (-0.76)  (0.70)             (0.62)  (-0.17)  (0.01)          
Note: The change in the interest rate target is expressed in percent, and the interest rate changes are expressed in basis points. Anticipated and unanticipated changes in the interest rate target 
are computed from the future interest rates, as described in the text. Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.1. t-statistics in parentheses.  
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5.1. Empirical evidence from maturation and wisdom periods 
 
This  section  analyzes  the  results  for  the  response  of  futures  interest  rates  to 
changes in the interest rate target for two distinct periods: (i) maturation period - from 
July 1999 to December 2003; and (ii) wisdom period – from January 2004 to January 
2009. The analysis for these periods considers only the responses of interest rates in the 
futures market due to two main reasons: (i) the number of observations regarding the 
variation of the interest rates in LTNs market becomes very reduced for both periods; 
and (ii) the models which used the futures market  for the whole period presented a 
greater capacity of explanation regarding the responses of interest rates. 
  Table  3  shows  the  number  of  observations  between  maturation  and  wisdom 
periods regarding the number of interest rate changes in basis points for futures interest 
rates  before  and  after  every  of MPC’s 103  meetings.  The  objective of splitting the 
whole period   is  an  attempt  to  perceive  if  the  CBB’s  behavior  based  on  more 
transparency allows the financial market to have a better perception of its actions. Due 
to the  fact that this  process takes  time, it  is  probable  that the results  regarding the 
wisdom period present a better quality in comparison to that from maturation period. 
 
Table 3 
Frequency of negotiations in futures market – Maturation and Wisdom periods 
Maturity 
  Whole 
 period 
  Maturation  
period 
  Wisdom  
period 
At most 1 month   FIR0    103    54    49 
At most 2 months  FIR1    101    53    48 
At most 3 months  FIR2    97    52    45 
At most 4 months  FIR3    85    47    38 
At most 5 months  FIR4    35    24    11 
At most 6 months  FIR5    45    25    20 
At most 7 months  FIR6    37    20    17 
Note: Whole period is from July 1999 to January 2009. Maturation period is from July 1999 
to December 2003. Wisdom period is from January 2004 to January 2009. 
    
The results of the estimations are presented in table 4. Focusing on the Cook-
Hahn  model,  the  estimations  denote  that  the  responses  of  futures  interest  rates  to 
changes in the interest rate target are strongest for the maturation period when short 
horizons are considered. Taking into consideration horizons greater than 3 months, the 
response is greater for the wisdom period (exception is FIR5). Moreover, it is important 
to highlight that the wisdom period presents higher R
2 and lower standard errors.  
A possible interpretation for the result above is that the disclosure of the interest 
rate target in the period when the public has more capacity to perceive the central bank 
actions (that is, the wisdom period), it is important to guide futures interest rates with 
longer maturities. On the other hand, while the information is not well comprehended 
by the market (that is, the maturation period), the disclosures of the interest rate target 
cause an impact basically on futures interest rates of short maturity. 
  Such as observed from the results in the Cook-Hahn model, the results observed 
in Kuttner1 model indicate that the difference between maturation and wisdom periods 
cannot be neglected. The wisdom period shows higher R
2 and lower standard errors for   13
all horizons, which in turn, indicates more confidence in the estimations. The standard 
errors in wisdom period are close to that found by Cook and Hahn (1989) and Kuttner 
(2001) for the American financial market. As a consequence, the lower standard errors 
can reveal a better comprehension of the financial market in regard to the central bank 
actions. 
The apparent surprising result is that the difference between the coefficients on 
anticipated and unanticipated responses is greater in the wisdom period than maturation 
period. However, it is important to note that the confidence of the outcomes observed in 
the maturation period is questionable due to the high standard errors of regressions. In 
addition, one very important observation is regarding the results from Wald tests. While 
for  the  maturation period,  the  tests  indicate that there  is  no  difference  between the 
coefficients of non-anticipation and anticipation responses of futures interest rates to 
changes  in  the  interest  rate  target  for  several  horizons,  in  the  wisdom  period  the 
difference between them is assured for all horizons. Hence, although the unanticipated 
response is greater than the anticipated response in this model, it is possible to assure 
that the use of the EHT is more adequate for the wisdom period. Last but not least, in a 
general way, the outcomes in the Kuttner2 model do not present significant differences 
in comparison to those observed in Kuttner1 model.  Table 4 
The response of futures interest rates to changes in the interest rate target (Maturation and Wisdom periods) 
Cook-Hahn    Kuttner1    Kuttner2     
Maturity 
 
Intercept  Response  R














2  SE  DW 
 
4.42  37.73  0.51  35.37  1.88    7.53  34.37  38.74  0.53  34.48  1.99    4.84  33.54  35.11  0.55  33.94  1.96  FIR0 
  (0.92)  (7.20)***             (1.54)  (6.47)***  (7.58)***             (1.04)  (6.38)***  (6.91)***          
 
5.5  29.17  0.20  52.42  1.77    8.78  25.66  30.66  0.24  51.80  1.78    5.81  23.60  25.66  0.26  50.85  1.79  FIR1 
  (0.76)  (3.59)***             (1.19)  (3.11)***  (3.83)***             (0.83)  (2.87)***  (3.22)***          
 
7.15  27.68  0.17  57.83  1.74    10.22  24.48  28.86  0.20  57.61  1.76    7.44  22.38  24.47  0.23  56.44  1.77  FIR2 
  (0.89)  (3.23)***             (1.23)  (2.76)***  (3.38)***             (0.95)  (2.56)**  (2.90)***          
  6.06  18.53  0.06  62.02  2.39    8.93  7.29  16.32  0.14  60.19  2.32    4.56  9.22  11.95  0.15  59.66  2.30  FIR3 
  (0.65)  (1.72)*             (0.98)  (0.61)  (1.57)             (0.51)  (0.83)  (1.12)          
  -11.77  14.43  0.08  40.81  1.63    -7.96  -0.64  6.71  0.25  37.82  1.38    -11.51  11.80  12.12  0.08  41.82  1.63  FIR4 
  (-1.39)  (1.42)             (-0.99)  (-0.06)  (0.69)             (-1.31)  (0.99)  (1.06)          
  4.77  50.82  0.46  44.29  2.30    11.08  50.04  57.48  0.51  43.42  2.24    8.72  42.13  45.49  0.60  39.25  2.16  FIR5 
  (0.54)  (4.45)***             (1.21)  (4.60)***  (4.70)***             (1.10)  (4.17)***  (4.60)***          




















  (0.76)  (0.31)             (1.13)  (-0.63)  (0.48)             (0.54)  (-0.16)  (-0.05)          
  1.41  18.72  0.40  9.80  1.73    0.84  11.30  20.15  0.59  8.17  2.15    0.80  13.76  16.19  0.57  8.39  2.09  FIR0 
  (0.99)  (5.62)***             (0.71)  (3.53)***  (7.21)***             (0.66)  (4.47)***  (5.56)***          
  2.35  14.53  0.30  9.68  1.81    1.64  5.77  16.19  0.62  7.17  2.39    1.56  8.17  11.28  0.64  7.01  2.39  FIR1 
  (1.66)  (4.41)***             (1.55)  (2.05)**  (6.60)***             (1.51)  (3.17)***  (4.63)***          
  4.07  18.38  0.32  11.74  1.72    2.87  8.12  21.87  0.64  8.59  2.35    2.86  11.38  14.97  0.62  8.82  2.35  FIR2 
  (2.29)**  (4.46)***             (2.18)**  (2.36)**  (7.13)***             (2.11)**  (3.43)***  (4.75)***          
  3.94  18.72  0.23  14.35  1.96    2.12  5.67  21.78  0.56  10.99  2.00    2.70  11.92  15.89  0.55  11.15  2.20  FIR3 
  (1.62)  (3.25)***             (1.11)  (1.11)  (4.90)***             (1.41)  (2.55)**  (3.53)***          
  8.70  22.00  0.15  21.90   2.13    3.94  -5.88  36.39  0.61  15.69   2.33    5.30  14.52  21.08  0.40  19.41  1.37  FIR4 
  (1.30)  (1.24)             (0.78)  (-0.38)  (2.68)**             (0.85)  (0.89)  (1.33)          
  6.66  24.18  0.44  13.34  1.32     6.24  18.26  26.80  0.58  11.84   1.59    4.30  16.53  19.74  0.69  10.29  1.99   FIR5 
  (2.16)**  (3.76)***             (2.27)**  (2.94)***  (4.62)***             (1.74)*  (3.07)***  (3.87)***          
















  (0.14)  (2.00)*             (0.06)  (-0.28)  (1.86)*             (0.76)  (0.42)  (0.96)          
Note: The change in the interest rate target is expressed in percent, and the interest rate changes are expressed in basis points. Anticipated and unanticipated changes in the interest rate target 
are computed from the future interest rates, as described in the text. Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.1. t-statistics in parentheses.   15
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The empirical  analysis  of  changes  in  the  Brazilian  financial  market  behavior 
after adoption of inflation targeting, reveals that the use of the interest rate of futures 
market  is  better than  interest  rates  of  LTNs market  in  the  three  models considered 
(Cook-Hahn, Kuttner1, and Kuttner2). Moreover, taking into account the results from 
Kuttner1 and Kuttner2 models, the difference between unanticipated and anticipated 
responses of futures interest rates to changes in the interest rate target is not negligible. 
Notwithstanding,  it  is  not  possible  to  state  that  there  exists  an  increase  in  the 
anticipation of the financial market to the central bank actions. The macroeconomic 
stabilization  and  the  presence  of  the  inflation  targeting  are  permitting  a  better 
comprehension of the market agents, but this perception is not clearly observed through 
anticipation of MPC’s decisions. 
The analysis concerning the response of futures interest rates to changes in the 
interest rate target for the maturation period and the wisdom period deserves attention. 
Based on the results from Cook-Hahn model, the maturation period is relevant only for 
short horizons while the wisdom period is also relevant for extended horizons. As a 
consequence, it is possible to conjecture that in the wisdom period the central bank is 
successful for influencing the expectations and thus increasing the capacity for setting 
the futures interest rates with longer maturities. 
  Kuttner1  and  Kuttner2  models  do  not  present  significant  differences  between 
themselves for the analysis of maturation and wisdom periods. In a general way, the 
wisdom period presents higher R
2 and lower standard errors for all horizons and thus 
indicates more confidence in the estimations. Furthermore, in the wisdom period the 
difference between non-anticipation and anticipation responses of futures interest rates 
to changes in the interest rate target is assured for all horizons. Although it is observed 
in  the  estimations  that  the  unanticipated  response  is  greater  than  the  anticipated 
response, it is possible to assure that the EHT is more adequate in this period.  
Therefore, the results from the Brazilian financial market are in consonance with 
the idea that a higher degree of central bank transparency can improve the efficiency of 
EHT. The findings indicate that the reaction of the financial market to changes in the 
interest  rate  target  is  not  negligible.  In  particular  the  fall  in  the  standard errors  for 
estimations in the wisdom period suggest that CBB’s behavior over time has increased 
the capacity of market agents to forecast the MPC’s decisions. In other words, in the 
Winkler’s (2000) sense, CBB seems honest with the disclosure of information and in 
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Wald tests of the 1=2 restriction (equation 3) 
   Whole period  Maturation period  Wisdom period 
   Kuttner1  Kuttner2  Kuttner1  Kuttner2  Kuttner1  Kuttner2 
LTN0  0.215  1.082  -  -  -  - 
  (0.645)  (0.304)         
LTN1  0.240  0.823  -  -  -  - 
  (0.627)  (0.371)         
LTN2  0.403  0.412  -  -  -  - 
  (0.529)  (0.525)         
LTN3  2.516  2.212  -  -  -  - 
  (0.121)  (0.145)         
LTN4  2.488  1.076  -  -  -  - 
  (0.125)  (0.308)         
LTN5  0.060  0.051  -  -  -  - 
  (0.809)  (0.822)         
LTN6  1.698  0.205  -  -  -  - 
  (0.202)  (0.654)         
FIR0  7.014  11.584  3.625  5.374  21.648  18.163 
  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.063)  (0.025)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
FIR1  4.415  9.258  2.102  4.066  38.807  42.713 
  (0.038)  (0.003)  (0.153)  (0.049)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
FIR2  2.896  7.709  1.298  3.418  38.288  34.219 
  (0.092)  (0.007)  (0.260)  (0.071)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
FIR3  7.516  9.610  3.709  4.557  26.330  24.631 
  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.061)  (0.038)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
FIR4  7.692  0.204  4.781  0.086  9.534  3.455 
  (0.009)  (0.654)  (0.040)  (0.772)  (0.015)  (0.100) 
FIR5  3.782  14.730  2.397  7.866  5.858  13.249 
  (0.059)  (0.000)  (0.136)  (0.010)  (0.027)  (0.002) 
FIR6  4.620  2.440  2.643  1.063  7.582  2.534 
  (0.039)  (0.128)  (0.122)  (0.317)  (0.016)  (0.133) 
Note: F-statistics are accompanied by P-values (between parentheses). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 